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WYOMING POLITICAL SURPRISES IN THE 
LATE 1980s 
DEVIATING ELECTIONS IN A CONSERVATIVE 
REPUBLICAN STATE 
CAL AND JANET CLARK 
Wyoming is typical of the states in the upper 
Great Plains region (Montana, Kansas, Ne-
braska, and North and South Dakota) in many 
but not all aspects. In socioeconomic terms, the 
Great Plains are basically agricultural and rural 
with fewer prominent urban centers than else-
where in the nation. Politically the region is 
generally viewed as conservative and Republi-
can, but this image is subject to several impor-
tant caveats. First, agrarian crises have 
periodically fueled insurgent political move-
ments, such as the Populism of the 1890s, Pro-
gressivism in the early twentieth century, strong 
support for Roosevelt's New Deal, and support 
for populist or liberal Democrats, especially in 
congressional elections, during times of agri-
cultural downturn in the postwar period. Sec-
ond, the political party structures and partisan 
loyalties of the electorate in most of these states 
Cal and Janet Clark are professors of political sci-
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have not been particularly strong; conse-
quently, important Democratic politicians pe-
riodically emerge (e.g., George McGovern in 
South Dakota or Robert Kerrey in Nebraska) 
on the basis of idiosyncratic or personal ap-
peals. 1 
The political victories of Democrats, Pro-
gressive Republicans, or Populist third parties 
in the Great Plains, therefore, have taken two 
distinct forms. First, they can represent a "re-
alignment" in which the electorate rejects the 
dominant conservative Republican philosophy, 
usually in response to economic crisis, for what 
have so far been short periods. Second, election 
losses of conservative Republicans can simply 
represent "deviating elections" in which per-
sonal triumphs do not really challenge the dom-
inant position of the majority party. 2 
Wyoming has a well-deserved reputation as 
a staunchly conservative and Republican state, 
and its political hue has changed little over time 
despite the boom-and-bust nature of its econ-
omy. For example while the effects of populism 
at the end of the nineteenth century and the 
New Deal of the 1930s certainly reached the 
state, Wyoming was never dominated by pop-
ulist political groups, such as the Nonpartisan 
League of North Dakota, and did not produce 
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great Progressive leaders, such as George Norris 
of Nebraska, although the Progressives did elect 
three governors and a U.S. senator between 
1910 and 1920. 3 Thus, the rare victories of 
Democrats running for major state office gen-
erally appear to have been "deviating elections" 
that call for special explanations. 
This paper examines two recent Wyoming 
elections in which Democrats did much better 
than expected, the 1986 upset of Pete Simpson 
by Mike Sullivan for governor and the very near 
upset of incumbent U.S. Senator Malcolm Wal-
lop by John Vinich in 1988. In particular it asks 
whether they represent "deviations" from the 
normal pattern of politics in Wyoming or might 
constitute harbingers of some type of "political 
realignment." The first section discusses the 
economic and political context of Wyoming, 
the second describes the two campaigns, and 
the third considers why different types of voters 
supported specific candidates. 
THE WYOMING CONTEXT 
Wyoming is an essentially rural state. Each 
of its two largest cities, Cheyenne and Casper, 
has only about 50,000 inhabitants, and only 
one other city has even 25,000. Before the en-
ergy boom of the mid-1970s, only five cities 
and towns had even 5000 people residing in 
them. Wyoming now has the smallest popula-
tion of any state in America and the second 
lowest population density. 
The state's economy is primarily based upon 
its rich mineral endowment: oil, natural gas, 
coal, trona, and uranium. This dependency on 
natural resources has resulted in a tremendous 
boom-and-bust cycle of rapid development fol-
lowed by depression-like conditions. In the lat-
est cycle, the energy boom brought a 41 percent 
increase in population during the 1970s in con-
trast to an actual loss of population during the 
1960s. It also made the state one of the most 
prosperous in the nation. In 1967 Wyoming 
ranked 24th in per capita income, which was 
4 percent below the national average. By 1981 
the state had skyrocketed to 5th, 13 percent 
above the national average. The collapse of the 
oil market in the mid-1980s devastated the state's 
economy. By 1987 Wyoming's per capita in-
come rank had fallen to 37th, 18 percent below 
the national average. Between 1982 and 1987, 
total gross state product actually declined by 11 
percent in current dollars and a whopping 24 
percent in constant (inflation adjusted) 1982 
dollars, and the state lost 4 percent of its pop-
ulation. 4 Moreover, there were few signs of eco-
nomic recovery as the decade ended. In fact 
Wyoming had the slowest growth rate in the 
nation for the year ending September 1988. 5 
The state's economic collapse clearly affected 
the citizenry's outlook. In 1980, 44 percent of 
the population believed that their personal eco-
nomic situation was improving compared to 25 
percent who saw it deteriorating. In 1986 and 
1988, however, these percentages were almost 
exactly reversed (22 percent to 42 percent). 6 
Thus, by the late 1980s almost half of Wyo-
ming's citizens perceived themselves to be los-
ing out economically. 
The descent of Wyoming into a recession 
might well be expected to have political con-
sequences. Studies of national politics have 
concluded that favorable economic conditions 
promote the electoral chances of incumbents 
and the majority party while voters are much 
more likely to "throw the rascals out" during 
economic hard times. Whether this economic 
dynamic operates at the state level is more of 
an open question. One preliminary study con-
cluded that economic conditions have little im-
pact at the state level and that voters tend to 
blame the president and his party, rather than 
state officials, for economic distress. 7 
This latter expectation evidently applies to 
Wyoming and explains an important charac-
teristic of the state's politics--a remarkably high 
level of popular support for incumbents regard-
less of their party affiliation or the state of the 
economy. For example, the mid-1980s eco-
nomic recession did not produce surprising up-
sets of previously popular politicians such as 
occurred elsewhere in the Great Plains with the 
losses of U.S. Senators Mark Andrews of North 
Dakota and James Abdnor of South Dakota in 
1986. 
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TABLE 1. 
ApPROVAL RATINGS OF Top POLITICAL OFFICIALS 
1980 
Carter, President, D 27% 
Reagan, President, R 
Wallop, Senator, R 75% 
Simpson, Senator, R 82% 
Cheney, Representative, R 76% 
Herschler, Governor, D 77% 
Sullivan, Governor, D 
This popularity of incumbents is illustrated 
by Wyoming's approval ratings of incumbent 
politicians during the 1980s (Table 1). Except 
for the Democratic President Jimmy Carter in 
1980, all these approval ratings were quite high, 
whether for the Republican congressional del-
egation of Richard Cheney, Alan Simpson, and 
Malcolm Wallop and the Republican President 
Ronald Reagan or for Democratic Governors 
Ed Herschler and Mike Sullivan. A significant 
drop in all the approval ratings occurred be-
tween 1980 and 1982, but this was primarily 
caused by a change in the wording of the survey 
question. 8 Since the state's economy was start-
ing to stagnate at this time, it might be thought 
that this drop could represent a response to the 
economy, but the advent of real recession later 
in the decade was accompanied by high ap-
proval ratings across the board. Otherwise, most 
of the approval ratings fell in the very strong 
range of 60 percent to 70 percent with two 
significant exceptions. 
The first was approval of Senator Malcolm 
Wallop's job performance, which fell to just 
under 50 percent in the two years he was up 
for reelection, 1982 and 1988, suggesting that 
increasing his contact with the voters and the 
salience of his record might be counterpro-
ductive for his popularity. Second, President 
Reagan's popularity dropped from 66 percent in 
1986 to 53 percent in 1988, implying that he 
might have been given some of the blame for 
1982 1984 1986 1988 
54% 64% 66% 53% 
47% 60% 59% 47% 
61% 71% 69% 65% 
60% 71% 63% 64% 
63% 65% 63% 
63% 
the state's depressed condition. Even if this were 
so, however-and Wyomingites actually blamed 
most of their troubles on Arab oil sheiks-the 
electorate was certainly not in the mood to re-
taliate against Republican candidates, as wit-
nessed by George Bush's two-to-one victory in 
the 1988 presidential election. 9 
Wyoming's seeming love affair with incum-
bents raises the question of who becomes an 
incumbent. Historically the Republican party 
has maintained the strong advantage. Except 
for a brief period during the New Deal, the 
Republicans have almost always had majorities 
in both houses of the state legislature. Except 
for gubernatorial races, in which they have 
triumphed in slightly more than half the elec-
tions, Republicans have won all major national 
and state offices between 60 percent and 70 
percent of the time. Democrats almost caught 
up to Republicans in registration, party iden-
tification, and state legislative seats during the 
mid-1970s, benefiting from Watergate and an 
influx of new voters, but the Republicans quickly 
reestablished their predominance and by the 
late 1980s had approximately 60 percent-30 
percent leads in registration and party identi-
fication and two-to-one advantages in the state 
house and senate. In addition, there is a major 
regional division in Wyoming between the five 
counties along the southern border and the rest 
of the state. The southern counties tend to be 
slightly Democratic, reflecting the historical 
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legacy of labor associated with the Union Pa-
cific railroad that goes'through them, while the 
northern part of the state is overwhelmingly 
Republican and much more heavily influenced 
by agriculture and the oil and gas industries. In 
a comparative sense, Wyoming was the fifth 
most Republican state in the nation for the two 
decades between 1961 and 1981. Thus Wyo-
ming clearly deserves its reputation as a domi-
nant one-party Republican state. 10 
Given this one-party domination, two recent 
elections were quite startling. In 1986 incum-
bent Democratic Governor Ed Herschler retired 
after serving three four-year terms, the longest 
tenure in the state's history. Herschler's elec-
toral success, incidentally, confirms that special 
circumstances are needed for Democratic vic-
tories. He was first elected in 1974 only after a 
highly divisive Republican primary and ap-
peared headed for defeat in 1978 until he man-
aged to convince voters that his championing 
of severance taxes was a way to shift the burden 
for financing state government to out-of-state 
energy consumers, not the persecution of pri-
vate enterprise, as his Republican challenger 
charged." By 1982, however, his middle-of-the-
road policies and association with the oil boom 
had made him extremely popular, and he was 
easily reelected for a third term. 
The Republicans in 1986 anticipated an easy 
reclaiming of the governor's mansion, but some-
thing happened on the way to the victory stand, 
and Republican Pete Simpson lost by a 54 per-
cent to 46 percent margin. Two years later, two-
term incumbent Republican Senator Malcolm 
Wallop was running for reelection against John 
Vinich. Wallop's strong approval ratings in 1984 
and 1986 and the absence of a widely known 
Democratic candidate seemingly betokened an 
easy win, yet on election eve Wallop saw his 
margin cut to sixty votes with only a few pre-
cincts outstanding before finally winning by just 
over a thousand votes. 
These surprising results in the last two gen-
eral elections, however, certainly did not appear 
to be a harbinger of a political realignment 
within Wyoming. The Republicans maintained 
their overwhelming leads in party registration 
and identification, there was little change in 
the composition of the state legislature, and 
other Republicans at the top of the ballot, such 
as Congressman Dick Cheney and President 
George Bush, coasted home. Furthermore, after 
Congressman Dick Cheney was appointed Sec-
retary of Defense, Vinich lost the special elec-
tion for his House seat by a fairly decisive 53 
percent to 43 percent margin. l2 Thus, the Simp-
son and Wallop races can be seen as "deviating" 
from the normal pattern of Republican domi-
nation. 
Pete Simpson and Malcolm Wallop were cer-
tainly an odd couple in a political sense, which 
makes the similarity of their loss of normal Re-
publican support all the more striking. Wallop 
is a strong conservative who faced no realistic 
competition for renomination. In contrast, 
Simpson is a moderate Republican who won his 
party's nomination in an extremely close pri-
mary. 
THE SIMPSON VS. SULLIVAN CAMPAIGN 
In 1986 the majority Republicans had both 
advantages and disadvantages going into the 
gubernatorial election. On one hand, since there 
was no incumbent, the majority party did not 
have its usual advantage, but on the other, the 
absence of a strong Democratic contender lxxied 
well for the Republicans because of their two-
to-one lead in registration. The Republicans 
certainly appeared quite optimistic. Thus, the 
promise of a return to the statehouse after a 
twelve-year exile drew a bevy of strong candi-
dates into the Republican primary. Stan Smith, 
the incumbent state treasurer, appeared to be 
the initial leader, but he withdrew as the field 
grew and his expected political and financial 
support did not materialize. The front-runner 
then became Pete Simpson, brother of U.S. 
Senate Majority Whip Alan Simpson and for-
mer state senator from Sheridan. Simpson ben-
efited from by far the greatest initial name 
recognition in the race, the popularity of his 
brother, and the fact that he had lived in several 
different regions of the state. Conversely he was 
hurt by his front-runner status, which drew most 
FIG. 1. Pete Simpson, Republican candidate for gov-
ernor, 1986, currently vice president for development, 
University of Wyoming. Photograph courtesy of Pete 
Simpson. 
of the other candidates' slings and arrows to 
him, and by his not altogether deserved liberal 
reputation, which stemmed from his days as a 
maverick state legislator whose views had di-
verged from the Republican caucus on such is-
sues as education, labor, and the role of state 
government. 13 Other prime contenders in-
cluded Bill Budd, a mainstream conservative 
and leading lobbyist for energy interests; Russ 
Donley, former speaker of the House (by tra-
dition in Wyoming speakers of the House serve 
one term and then retire) and the most con-
servative Republican in the race; Fred Schroe-
der, former Republican party chairman; and 
Dave Nicholas, a state senator who competed 
with Simpson for the moderate and liberal Re-
publican votes. 
Simpson remained the front-runner through-
out most of the summer, but in the last few 
weeks of the campaign conservative Republi-
cans began to unify around Bill Budd, and on 
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election day Simpson won with a paper-thin 
plurality of 453 votes over Budd-25,948 to 
25,495 out of 94,000 cast. The campaign had 
been marked more by personal jousting than 
issue debate, and there clearly were some hard 
feelings on the part of the losers, especially in 
the Budd camp, that were to haunt Simpson in 
the general election. 14 
The assumption that the Republicans would 
easily reclaim the governorship seemed to be 
shared by Democrats as well. Their only "re-
spectable" candidate was Mike Sullivan, a Cas-
per lawyer who was making his first major foray 
into electoral politics. He received strong party 
support against several fringe candidates who 
seemed to be viewed as potential embarrass-
ments by party leaders who sought to minimize 
their exposure before the primary election. Sul-
livan easily won the nomination with 70 per-
cent of the vote compared to 13 percent for the 
FIG. 2. Mike SuUivan, successful Democratic can-
didate for governor, 1986. Photograph courtesy of Mike 
Sullivan. 
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runner-up. A lawyer with close business ties, 
he had something of a conservative image that 
was probably helpful given the outcome of the 
Republican primary. 
The general election campaign quite natu-
rally focused on the gubernatorial race. Many 
observers assumed that Pete Simpson would have 
a fairly easy time in conservative Wyoming as 
the standard bearer of the dominant Republican 
party. This seemed to be the assumption of the 
Simpson campaign as, on the advice of national 
Republican consulting firms that it follow a 
Reaganesque style, it initially emphasized Simp-
son as a "sunshine candidate" who was closely 
tied to President Reagan and highly partisan in 
his political orientation. 15 
There were several indications, however, that 
such a front-runner's strategy might not be the 
best. The scars from the September primary were 
still raw and accentuated the perceptions of some 
that Simpson might be too liberal for main-
stream Wyoming Republicans. Governor Her-
schier shrewdly took advantage of this by offering 
Bill Budd a major position in his administration, 
removing Budd from the campaign and exac-
erbating Simpson's problems in creating party 
unity. Moreover the growing economic depres-
sion and financial problems in the state belied 
the sunshine approach. Finally Mike Sullivan 
was emerging as a formidable challenger whose 
support went beyond partisan affiliation to in-
trastate and ideological considerations. 
Intrastate politics are important in Wyo-
ming, especially the rivalry between the two 
largest cities (both with populations of about 
60,000 in the mid-1980s)-Casper, the nor-
mally Republican oil center in the north, and 
Cheyenne, the more Democratic state capital 
in the south. While Sullivan ran as a Democrat, 
he clearly became the "Casper candidate" and 
was endorsed by the Casper Star-Tribune, by far 
the dominant paper in the state. This clearly 
legitimized his candidacy in a manner unthink-
able for almost any other Democrat. Sullivan 
was also able to pick up some conservative and 
business support that is normally not forthcom-
ing to Democrats. 
The course of the campaign probably in-
volved style more than substance as the two 
candidates seemingly agreed on many of the 
major issues facing the state. Sullivan scored 
something of a public relations coup with a "me 
too" ad that listed the dates that the two can-
didates adopted various positions and pictured 
Simpson as simply saying "me too. "16 This in-
tegrated well with Sullivan's major theme of 
strong leadership and evidently appealed to the 
many Wyomingites who felt that the state's eco-
nomic crisis called for strong action. Sullivan's 
status as a political newcomer was an advantage 
since he could not be blamed for the current 
"mess." 
Simpson seemed to struggle with his image 
as a Republican with a liberal aura and tried to 
handle the problem by creating an image of 
himself as a "thoughtful conservative." He won 
the endorsement of the state workers based on 
his past record as a state senator but then tried 
to reassure the normal Republican constituency 
with calls to cut state government and a firm 
pledge not to raise taxes. Such temporizing 
probably cost Simpson votes with both sides. 17 
Sullivan in contrast linked himself with the 
Herschler administration and said that while he 
had no plans to raise taxes, he would not rule 
out anything in the face of financial crisis. 
A series of debates held around the state was 
generally beneficial for Sullivan. Both candi-
dates emerged as capable, intelligent, and well 
intentioned about meeting the state's economic 
crisis, and no great ideological or issue differ-
ences emerged between them. 18 Sullivan won, 
however, because the unknown and politically 
inexperienced Democrat had at least proven to 
be the debating equal of his more experienced 
Republican opponent. Candidate polls suggest 
that the debates probably worked to the chal-
lenger's advantage. In September, Simpson held 
a 10 percent to 15 percent lead, which, while 
significantly less than might have been ex-
pected, was still comfortable. Sullivan began to 
close by early October, and the two were run-
ning neck-and-neck two weeks before the elec-
tion. 19 
FIG. 3. John Vinich, Democratic candidate for U. s. 
Senate, 1988, currently Wyoming state senator. Pho-
tograph courtesy of Casper Star-Tribune. 
Over the last week or so in the campaign, 
there was a decided shift in the Democrat's fa-
vor, as there was in many U. S. Senate races 
around the country. When the votes were 
counted, Sullivan had scored a fairly decisive 
victory, garnering 54 percent of the vote to win 
by a margin of 13,OOO--by all accounts much 
to the surprise of both candidates. Much of Sul-
livan's margin came from a 5000 vote majority 
in Natrona County (Casper) and a 4000 one in 
Laramie County (Cheyenne). Thus, Sullivan 
was able to use his regional affiliation to carry 
the normally conservative and Republican Cas-
per and his partisan affiliation to win the more 
liberal and Democratic Cheyenne-quite a po-
litical feat for a supposed neophyte. zo 
THE WALLOP VS. VINICH CAMPAIGN 
In 1988 the party roles were reversed. Mal-
colm Wallop was a two-term incumbent Re-
publican u.S. senator who drew no serious 
challenge from within the party. Four minor 
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candidates ran against him in the primary, but 
he easily won with 86 percent of the vote versus 
6 percent for the second place finisher. 
Despite his strong support by the majority 
Republicans, however, Democrats thought that 
he might be vulnerable for several reasons. Wal-
lop was far less personally popular than Simpson 
and Cheney. While he had been elected as 
something of an environmentalist, he had be-
come a very vocal member of Republican right 
wing. ZI In addition, his national concerns with 
ideological and defense issues were viewed as 
overriding his ties with Wyoming, and the Sul-
livan upset gave Democrats some hope that mir-
acles were possible in Wyoming politics. Initially 
there was speculation that Ed Herschler would 
come out of retirement to run. As one of the 
most popular politicians of either party in the 
state (polls in late 1985 suggested that Herschler 
was more popular among Republicans than any 
FIG. 4. Incumbent Republican U.S. Senator Mal-
colm Wallop, reelected in 1988. Photograph courtesy 
of Malcolm Wallop. 
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aspiring gubernatorial candidate of that party), 
"Gov Ed" would have presented Wallop with a 
strong challenge. 22 
In the end, though, Herschler decided not 
to run, leaving the field for much less promising 
candidates. The first to announce was John 
Vinich, a state senator from Fremont County. 
Vinich was a strong and articulate campaigner, 
but he suffered from several decided handicaps. 
He was seen as too liberal for the state, and he 
was not well known in the population centers 
of Natrona and Laramie counties. He was chal-
lenged by Pete Maxfield, the former dean of the 
law school at the University of Wyoming, whose 
campaign was intellectually sophisticated but 
far from dynamic. Late in the contest, Lynn 
Simons, the state superintendent of public in-
struction, entered, presumably because of the 
perceived weakness of the other two candidates. 
Simons, who had handily won election to her 
statewide office several times, was presumed to 
be the front-runner, but on election day Vinich 
won easily with 47 percent of the vote, com-
pared to 30 percent for Maxfield and 23 percent 
for Simons. Rumors suggest that Wallop may 
have asked some of his supporters to vote for 
Vinich in the Democratic primary, which Re-
publicans could do easily in Wyoming, but the 
scope of Simons's defeat went far beyond any 
such gamesmanship. 23 
With Simons out of contention, the Wallop 
forces relaxed in anticipation of an easy cam-
paign. The late Wyoming primary, 16 August, 
gave the incumbent senator another important 
advantage since the short campaign for the gen-
eral election limited the challenger's ability to 
gain name recognition and to get his message 
across. Vinich had two advantages that the Re-
publicans sorely underestimated, however. First, 
he ran an aggressive grassroots campaign that 
struck a strong chord among Wyomingites. Sec-
ond, he was supported by organized labor, which 
helped him offset the huge war chest that Wal-
lop had accumulated before the campaign. 
Beginning with the primary, Vinich attacked 
Wallop's record on a number of fronts. Most 
basically, he pictured himself as a populist and 
working man who was much more in tune with 
the citizenry of Wyoming than was his elitist 
opponent who had "entertained the Queen of 
England." He argued that he was concerned 
with providing jobs and aid for the ravaged 
economy of Wyoming, without necessarily in-
dicating what he would do, while Wallop had 
lost touch with his native state in his zealous 
pursuit of right-wing Republican politics in 
Washington. The argument that Wallop had 
lost touch was certainly understandable since 
the senator had used the same line of attack to 
unseat incumbent Democrat Gale McGee in 
1976. Wallop had also pledged at that time that 
he would retire after serving two terms in order 
to avoid McGee-like forgetfulness of his polit-
ical roots. Vinich, needless to say, was quite 
happy to throw the senator's words back into 
his face. 
Vinich also pictured Wallop as an extremist 
who had gone beyond the pale of normal Re-
publican conservatism. In particular, Wallop's 
opposition to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (lNF) Treaty negotiated by the Reagan 
administration was derided; much was made of 
Wallop's participation in the symposium "spon-
sored by the Moonies"; and Wallop was accused 
of undermining Social Security and Medicare. 
Wallop's basic strategy was to respond in kind, 
calling Vinich an ultraliberal extremist whose 
views were totally unacceptable to responsible 
Wyomingites. Vinich's dependence on the sup-
port of organized labor, which is fairly unpop-
ular in Wyoming, was highlighted; and the 
challenger was mocked for" cleaning up" (i. e. , 
shaving his sideburns and wearing suits) for the 
election and for being a "bartender. "24 
In the early part of the campaign, Wallop 
had much more money and, thus, the ability 
to run a media campaign. Vinich offset this, 
though: while Wallop stayed busy in Washing-
ton Vinich's grassroots campaign of crisscross-
ing the state with individual appearances proved 
quite effective for the friends and neighbors pol-
itics of small Wyoming communities. Further-
more the Casper Star-Tribune was clearly anti-
Wallop and helped boost the Vinich cam-
paign. 25 Still, as the campaign entered its last 
few weeks, the incumbent appeared to have the 
race well in hand with a comfortable majority 
of 55 percent to 60 percent, comparable to his 
1982 reelection victory. 
The turning point was a televised debate that 
included the candidates for House and Senate 
seats. The House candidates, Richard Cheney 
and Bryan Sharratt, debated in gentlemanly 
fashion and showed themselves generally to fol-
low the ideology of mainstream Republicans or 
Democrats. The Wallop-Vinich debate that fol-
lowed demonstrated that these two were much 
further apart than Cheney and Sharratt and 
involved a good deal of personal vitriol. Vinich 
showed that he could exchange insults on a par 
with a U.S. senator and perhaps came off as 
slightly more articulate. What evidently hap-
pened, though, was that the widely watched 
debate convinced a significant part of the elec-
torate that Wallop had lost touch with Wyo-
ming as Vinich had charged. Consequently 
Wallop's lead narrowed. As Vinich's chances 
improved outside money flowed into his coffers, 
permitting him to run an aggressive media cam-
paign over the last two weeks and setting up 
the election night cliffhanger. 26 
INFLUENCES ON VOTING 
Because Simpson and Wallop were so dif-
ferent, the reasons for each candidate's failure 
to gamer the normal Republican vote of 57 
percent should be expected to differ as well. 27 
This section, hence, uses aggregate voting re-
turns and survey data to try to answer the ques-
tion of who voted for whom in these two 
elections. 
As previously noted, Wyoming politics is 
largely regional in nature, with the five counties 
along the Union Pacific railroad in the south 
generally leaning toward the Democrats and the 
rest of the state heavily Republican. Table 2 
examines how Simpson and Wallop did in each 
of the state's twenty-three counties, with Na-
trona County (Casper) being separated from the 
"rural Republican north." In addition to the 
share of the county's vote garnered by these two 
Republican candidates, the number of regis-
tered voters and Republican percentage of Re-
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publican plus Democratic registration in 1988 
are presented to indicate a county's electoral 
impact and normal political allegiance. 
The Republican domination of the north is 
obvious from these figures. In over half the 
counties, more than 70 percent of the people 
registering as either Democrats or Republicans 
belonged to the majority party, and except for 
Platte County (55 percent), the lowest Repub-
lican share of two-party registration was an im-
pressive 63 percent. The rural north, then, is 
the most conservative part of the state, and thus 
it is here that Simpson should have run well 
behind Wallop if the conventional interpreta-
tion that he lost because of perceived liberalism 
is correct. The data in Table 2 do support this 
interpretation since Wallop scored between 8 
percent and 18 percent higher than Simpson 
had two years earlier in nine of the seventeen 
counties. In contrast, Simpson ran ahead of 
Wallop in only two of these counties, and the 
only one where the margin was significant (8 
percent) was Vinich's home county, Fremont. 
Overall Simpson lost a third of the counties in 
the Republican heartland while Wallop carried 
all but Fremont. In addition, Simpson must have 
been quite disappointed with his narrow mar-
gins in Park County, his family's home county, 
and Sheridan County, which he had repre-
sented in the state legislature. 
Given Sullivan's hometown advantage in the 
1986 gubernatorial contest, Simpson should 
have been quite disadvantaged in Natrona 
County. In fact he only received 39 percent of 
the vote there, his third lowest total, and only 
slightly above the 36 percent he garnered in 
heavily Democratic Sweetwater County. (His 
other low county, Converse, borders on Na-
trona, and the two county seats share the same 
telephone book.) Wallop, then, should have 
done much better in this normally Republican 
stronghold. He did run significantly ahead of 
Simpson but still could only get 47 percent of 
the vote, a shortfall that made the election close. 
Wallop's poor showing, furthermore, deviated 
from the overall success of Republicans in Cas-
per/Natrona County in 1988, when Republi-
cans won both state senate positions and eight 
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TABLE 2. 
VOTING DATA BY COUNTY 
Simpson Wallop Republican Total 
1986 1988 Registration . Registration 
Rural North 
Big Hom 52% 56% 78% 6,003 
Campbell 59% 64% 83% 12,161 
Converse 37% 54% 76% 5,421 
Crook 56% 71% 78% 3,127 
Fremont 50% 42% 62% 16,200 
Goshen 43% 61% 60% 8,317 
Hot Springs 49% 52% 69% 2,930 
Johnson 53% 63% 85% 3,539 
Lincoln 53% 54% 63% 6,744 
Niobrara 45% 60% 87% 1,682 
Park 53% 61% 80% 12,339 
Platte 56% 52% 55% 4,977 
Sheridan 53% 54% 63% 12,821 
Sublette 56% 64% 85% 3,232 
Teton 60% 59% 71% 7,477 
Washakie 43% 58% 74% 4,613 
Weston 49% 64% 76% 3,587 
Urban North 
Natrona 39% 47% 61% 30,271 
South Tier 
Albany 41% 43% 50% 14,300 
Carbon 42% 44% 46% 8,317 
Laramie 41% 45% 50% 36,208 
Sweetwater 36% 37% 29% 16,910 
Uinta 57% 52% 58% 7,242 
'Republican percentage of Republican plus Democratic registration. 
of nine state house seats in the county. (All 
legislative positions are elected at-large by county 
in Wyoming.) Perhaps the depressed economy 
of oil-dependent Casper created some ill will 
toward the incumbent senator. 
The south is the best part of the state for 
Democrats, but even here the minority party 
really dominates only Sweetwater County. Party 
registration is about evenly divided in three oth-
ers, including Laramie County (Cheyenne, the 
other urban center in the state), and Republi-
cans have a comfortable registration lead in 
Uinta County. Simpson and Wallop both lost 
all of these counties except Uinta. What is sur-
prising, however, is that Wallop, the staunch 
conservative, ran 1 percent to 4 percent ahead 
of Simpson in all four. Thus, while the con-
servative counties in the rural north punished 
Simpson for his alleged liberalism, the most lib-
eral counties in the state punished him as well, 
not even giving him the level of support that 
Malcolm Wallop could gamer. Simpson's poor 
showing in the south, therefore, sealed his de-
feat. 
Surveys of actual voter attitudes confirm the 
conclusion from the aggregate voting data that 
Simpson's losses among conservatives and Re-
publicans were not counterbalanced by gains 
among liberals and Democrats. Table 3 breaks 
down support for Simpson and Wallop accord-
ing to party identification and ideology.28 The 
percentages show what proportion of voters in 
each group (e.g., weak Republicans) supported 
Simpson and Wallop, and the overall strength 
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of the relationship between vote and party iden-
tification or ideology is measured by the cor-
relation coefficient gamma. 
These data confirm several of our expecta-
tions about the Simpson and Wallop cam-
paigns. First, Simpson lost a substantially higher 
share of Republican votes than he gained among 
Democrats. While 7 percent of strong Demo-
crats voted for him, 21 percent of strong Re-
publicans defected to Sullivan-a gap 
exacerbated by the fact that there are almost 
twice as many strong Republicans as strong 
Democrats in the state. Sullivan also did some-
what better among Republicans and weak Re-
TABLE 3. 
IMPACf OF PARTY ID AND IDEOLOGY ON VOTE 
Simpson 1986 Wallop 1988 
Party ID 
Strong Democrat 7% 9% 
Democrat 33% 28% 
Weak Democrat 30% 24% 
Independent 35% 48% 
Weak Republican 63% 65% 
Republican 62% 68% 
Strong Republican 79% 90% 
Gamma .55 .69 
Ideology 
Strong Liberal 64% 23% 
Liberal 49% 25% 
Weak Liberal 31% 31% 
Middle of Road 43% 43% 
Weak Conservative 47% 68% 
Conservative 62% 76% 
Strong Conservative 53% 78% 
Gamma .18 .54 
Gamma is a correlation coefficient that provides a statistical measure of how strong the relationship 
between two variables is. It varies from 0 when there is no relationship to 1 when there is a perfect 
relationship (i.e., the values of one variable can be exactly predicted from the values of another in 
all cases). As a rough scale for evaluating gamma, 0 to .15 shows no association; . 15 to .25 shows 
a weak association; .25 to .40 shows a moderate association; .40 to .60 shows a fairly strong 
association; and .60 to 1 shows a very strong association. 29 
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publicans (38 percent) than Simpson did among 
Democrats and weak Democrats (31 percent). 
In addition, Sullivan carried the independents, 
who generally strongly support the Republicans 
in Wyoming,30 by almost a two-to-one margin. 
The distribution of Wallop's support by party 
identification paralleled Simpson's in several re-
spects but differed substantially in two impor-
tant categories. On one hand, Wallop, despite 
his much more conservative and partisan image, 
did only slightly better among Republicans and 
weak Republicans (67 percent to 62 percent) 
and worse among Democrats and weak Demo-
crats (26 percent to 31 percent)-although this 
gap worked significantly in his favor because 
there are almost twice as many Republicans as 
Democrats in Wyoming. Further, Wallop ac-
tually did slightly better among strong Demo-
crats (9 percent to 7 percent). On the other 
hand, Wallop substantially outpolled Simpson 
among two groups of voters whose support en-
sured his victory. First, he lost only half the 
strong Republicans that Simpson did (10 per-
cent to 21 percent), and second, he did much 
better in appealing to independents (48 percent 
to 35 percent). 
Thus partisanship was clearly a central factor 
in voting in both these races, but the relation-
ship was stronger for Wallop than for Simpson 
(gamma = .69 and .55 respectively). Given 
the tremendous numerical advantage of Repub-
licans, therefore, Simpson's lesser ability to 
evoke a partisan division accounts for his loss, 
in contrast to Wallop's narrow victory. 
As would be expected given the nature of 
the two campaigns, the contrast between Wal-
lop's and Simpson's appeals is much sharper in 
terms of ideological breakdown. Responding to 
the harsh ideological debate between Wallop 
and Vinich, about three-quarters of conserva-
tives in Wyoming supported the Republican and 
three-quarters of liberals supported the Demo-
crat. Vinich comfortably carried the middle-of-
the-roaders by 57 percent, but the conservative 
nature of the state worked to Wallop's advan-
tage in this ideological division (the gamma was 
a fairly strong .54). 
The relationship between ideology and gub-
ernatorial vote in 1986 was more convoluted 
(the gamma was only a moderate .18) as would 
be expected from the blurred ideological images 
of the two candidates. Simpson's liberal image 
was evidently picked up by the voters. He re-
ceived an almost astonishing 52 percent of the 
vote from the tenth of the electorate who con-
sider themselves liberals or strong liberals, while 
Sullivan garnered 40 percent of the vote of the 
conservatives and strong conservatives who 
constitute a third of the voters--a goodly ac-
complishment for a Democrat in Wyoming. In 
addition, Sullivan dominated the middle of the 
ideological spectrum-winning 60 percent of 
the votes from weak liberals and middle-of-the-
roaders and carrying the weak conservatives by 
53 percent. 
In comparative terms, Wallop ran about 20 
percent ahead of Simpson among conservatives, 
while Simpson had a 25 percent advantage 
among liberals and strong liberals, again indi-
cating that Simpson lost votes because of his 
perceived deviation from the state's mainstream 
Republican conservatism. Thus these data for 
strong conservatives and liberals are consistent 
with the conclusion that Simpson's perceived 
liberalism was one of the major factors in the 
race-proportionately, he gained more among 
liberals than he lost among conservatives, but 
this meant an absolute loss of votes because 
there are so few liberals in Wyoming. Sullivan 
really won the election because he dominated 
the center of the electorate, however-a find-
ing that is somewhat inconsistent with the pic-
ture of a Simpson candidacy that alienated 
conservatives and party workers attached to his 
primary rivals. 
This suggests that other factors may well have 
affected these two deviating elections. One cer-
tainly would be Wyoming's economic collapse, 
and another slightly less obvious one might be 
alienation from the federal government. By the 
late 1980s, for example, Wyomingites by an 
approximately two-to-one margin believed that 
their personal financial conditions were dete-
riorating rather than improving and that a fed-
eral government dominated by "big interests" 
could not be trusted. People feeling economic 
WYOMING POLITICAL SURPRISES 193 
TABLE 4. 
IMPACT OF FINANCIAL STRESS AND POLITICAL ALIENATION ON VOTE 
Simpson 1986 Wallop 1988 
Personal Finances 
Worse 44% 
Same 52% 
Better 57% 
Gamma .18 
Wyoming Taxes 
Reasonable 47% 
Too High 66% 
Gamma .36 
Trust Federal Government 
Never 33% 
Some 47% 
Mostly 57% 
Almost Always 54% 
Gamma .20 
Federal Government Represents 
Big Interests 45% 
Unsure 57% 
All Citizens 59% 
Gamma .24 
stress might well be turned off by Simpson's 
sunshine campaign and receptive to Vinich's 
charges that Wallop was an elitist who had lost 
touch with his constituents. The relationship 
between alienation from the federal govern-
ment and voting behavior is more problematic, 
though. On one hand, those feeling alienated 
might vote against the state's Republican es-
tablishment. On the other, Wyoming Repub-
licans (as well as Ronald Reagan) have 
consistently appealed to the state's ill feelings 
toward the "feds"-Wallop's initial campaign 
denounced OSHA in a television ad that showed 
an outhouse being dragged around the prairie. 
Table 4 explores these various possibilities. 
People feeling financial stress were about 12 
47% 
51% 
60% 
.17 
52% 
54% 
.04 
37% 
50% 
60% 
67% 
.24 
45% 
69% 
72% 
.46 
percent more likely to vote against both Simp-
son and Wallop than those who believed their 
personal financial situations to be improving, 
producing moderate gammas of .18 and .17. 
Another measure of stress might be opposition 
to taxes. Simpson made opposition to tax in-
creases a major platform plank, and Wallop de-
nounced Vinich as a big spending liberal. 
Simpson did do very well among citizens who 
believed Wyoming's taxes to be too high, gar-
nering 66 percent of their votes, but unfortu-
nately for him, only 10 percent of Wyomingites 
felt this was the case. Simpson's antitax attitude 
partially explains his poor showings in Laramie 
and Albany counties, whose many state em-
ployees probably translated no new taxes into 
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no pay raises. Surprisingly (although U.S. sen-
ators have no influence over state taxes), feel-
ings about taxes were unrelated to votes in the 
Wallop-Vinich race. 
The data in Table 4 also clearly demonstrate 
that Wyomingites who felt alienated from the 
federal government were about 10 percent more 
likely to vote for Democrats than Republicans 
in these two races, producing moderate gammas 
in the .20 to .25 range for three of the four 
relationships. In the fourth case the gamma was 
a strong .46, as Vinich won 55 percent of those 
who saw Washington dominated by big interests 
(71 percent of the electorate, incidentally), 
while Wallop carried 70 percent of the less cyn-
ical. This is a rather ironic reversal of Wallop's 
initial appeal in running against Gale McGee. 
It also suggests that Republicans in Wyoming 
should rethink some of their boilerplate rhetoric 
attacking Washington. 
Demographic factors, only marginally re-
lated to candidate choice, are shown in Table 
5. While Republicans usually do better among 
the middle and upper classes, both nationally 
and in Wyoming,31 the Republican advantage 
among people with greater education and in-
TABLE 5. 
IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS ON VOTING 
Simpson 1986 Wallop 1988 
Education 
High School or Less 48% 50% 
College 51% 54% 
Gamma .03 .08 
Family Income 
Under $20,000 47% 46% 
$20,000-$35,000 48% 50% 
Over $35,000 52% 57% 
Gamma .05 .15 
Gender 
Male 51% 54% 
Female 49% 51% 
Gamma -.04 -.06 
Age 
18-29 65% 54% 
30-49 47% 54% 
50-65 44% 51% 
Over 65 52% 50% 
Gamma .12 • .03 
'Cramer's V because the relationship does not follow an ordinal continuum. That is, Simpson did 
best with the very old and the very young. V is a correlation coefficient like gamma. Its values tend 
to be slightly lower than gamma, so a V of .12 denotes a weak relationship. (See note 29.) 
come was only significant (gamma = .15) for 
income's impact upon the Wallop-Vinich con-
test. Even here the degree of association is sur-
prisingly low given Vinich's stridently populist 
appeal. In addition, the gender gap that has 
emerged in national politics in recent years32 
was not a factor either. 
An interesting relationship exists between 
age and gubernatorial choice in 1986, however. 
Simpson won strongly among the young, get-
ting about 65 percent of the vote from those 
under thirty, and also carried those over sixty-
five by 52 percent. These are the groups who 
might be expected to feel the least threatened 
by the state's recession because retirees do not 
have to worry about losing jobs and young peo-
ple are the most economically mobile. Sullivan, 
in contrast, did best (56 percent) among those 
between fifty and sixty-five. Many people in this 
latter group obviously have deep roots in the 
state and limited mobility. Thus there is again 
the suggestion that economic strains may pro-
vide a subtle key to understanding this political 
upset. Such economic logic, however, would 
also imply that a similar relationship should ex-
ist for the Wallop-Vinich race, where it clearly 
did not. Perhaps Wallop's strong conservatism 
was less appealing to young voters than Simp-
son's more moderate Republicanism. 
This section has examined several potential 
influences on voting in the two deviating elec-
tions under consideration. Pete Simpson's per-
ceived liberalism evidently affected voting 
patterns significantly and resulted in his loss 
compared to Wallop's win, but the poor show-
ing of both Simpson and Malcolm Wallop com-
pared to normal Republican voting patterns 
indicates that other factors must have been at 
work as well. Economic stress and political cyn-
icism provide part of the explanation for the 
surprisingly poor showings of Simpson and Wal-
lop, but their effects are moderate even in these 
two elections. 
IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has examined two recent elec-
tions that deviate from the normal pattern of 
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Republican domination over Wyoming politics. 
In particular, it asked whether Pete Simpson's 
loss of the 1986 gubernatorial race and the ex-
tremely narrow victory of incumbent Malcolm 
Wallop in the 1988 U.S. Senate race primarily 
reflected the political idiosyncracies of the two 
candidates' appeals or were a more structured 
consequence of economic crisis and voter 
alienation. 
The answer to this question, unfortunately, 
is rather ambiguous and not entirely straight-
forward. At one level the economic crisis was 
amazingly inconsequential. Most statewide and 
legislative election results followed a business-
as-usual pattern, long-term political trends in 
the states were almost totally unaffected in both 
years, and voter support for incumbents re-
mained exceedingly strong-all belying any 
possibility of an economically stimulated re-
alignment in state politics. Thus economic dis-
tress in Wyoming has not reached the point 
where the voters inflict wholesale punishment 
on the political establishment. 
The strong showings by Sullivan and Vinich 
basically derived from the negative images of 
Simpson's liberalism and Wallop's patrician style 
of leadership, but given the strength of the Re-
publican party in Wyoming, these idiosyncratic 
disadvantages by themselves should not have 
threatened either candidacy. Thus although the 
relationships were only moderate in strength, 
economic stress and political alienation clearly 
had some impact on voting for governor in 1986 
and senator in 1988, as the economic crisis hy-
pothesis would predict. 
These contradictory tendencies suggest that 
the economic crisis probably did have an effect 
on the elections but one that was highly con-
strained by an important trait of the Wyoming 
electorate. Unlike voters in many other parts 
of the U. S., Wyomingites appear quite faithful 
to their leaders even when times tum bad. Times 
of crisis, then, provoke sympathy for embattled 
leaders rather than an irate "throw the rascals 
out" mentality. (The bankruptcy of a ranch 
owned by Governor Herschler stimulated an 
outpouring of public sympathy in 1986.) As a 
result incumbents are protected, and a seem-
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ingly business-as-usual atmosphere continues. 
The high degree of political cynicism among 
Wyomingites and its correlation with voting for 
Sullivan and Vinich, however, indicates that 
the economic crisis probably had significant 
negative effects for Simpson and Wallop. The 
former had an establishmentarian reputation 
because of his family ties but had not acquired 
the "halo effect" of political incumbency, while 
the latter lost his "halo effect" for reasons that 
are not entirely obvious, given his strong public 
approval in nonelection years, because alien-
ation from the federal government normally 
works to the advantage of conservatives and 
Republicans in western states like Wyoming. 
Wyoming, therefore, represents an interesting 
reversal of the normal American tendency for 
citizens to give much more "diffuse support" to 
the "general regime" of the American system 
as a whole than the "specific support" that they 
are willing to extend to individual governmen-
tal leaders, especially in times of political or 
economic stress. 33 
The partisan implications of this situation 
are somewhat contradictory as well. Republi-
cans can certainly be greatly heartened by the 
fact that despite the economic crisis, the loyal 
electorate is not yet disillusioned with the state's 
dominant party. They can be less happy, though, 
with the fact that the Democrats did so well in 
two important elections just at the time when 
the last viable statewide candidate from the 
Democrats' better days of the 1970s (others in-
cluded former U. S. Senator Gale McGee and 
former U.S. Representative Teno Roncalio) was 
departing from the Wyoming political scene. 
Republican loyalty evidently does not neces-
sarily extenq to nonincumbents when legiti-
mate alternatives exist. The ease with which 
Sullivan and Vinich established the legitimacy 
of their candida~ies should be disturbing even 
(or perhaps espe2ially) to a dominant party that 
enjoys an overwhelming two-to-one margin in 
registration and party identification. 
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